A unified brain theory?
This article may be of interest:
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? by Karl Friston. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11, 127-138 (February 2010) | doi:10.1038/nrn2787:
Friston, who is a key player in neuroscience/imaging, pairs up lingo, ideas and results that share grounds with dynamical and enactive approaches, but presents them in a reductionist interpretation.
He talks about the free energy principle, which broadly translates to sensorimotor entropy minimization, about how brain function self-organises according to homeostatic principles, etc. – ideas that you would not necessarily expect to read about in Nature. He argues how many major theories of brain function can be seen as a special case of this principle (Bayesian brain, theory of neuronal group selection, optimal control theory, …). An interesting review of cognitive neuroscience with sharp observations and bold claims.
The problem I see is that the issues enactivists typically raise are not addressed. In his view, agents are heteronomous: value is defined as the opposite of surprise (entropy minimization), rather than autonomously generated in interaction with the environment. Friston talks about organisms as self-organising systems, but he never addresses the problem of the distinction between the system and its environment and boundary construction. Similarly, in his conclusion he proposes that the brain is a “generative model of the world it inhabits”, keeping up a Cartesian divide between an observer-independent reality and its recration in the the brain, home to the mind.