The Life & Mind Seminar Network

AVANT Interview

Posted in General by Ezequiel on January 8, 2013

Hanne De Jaegher and I have been interviewed on our work on enactivism by the open access journal AVANT Volume III, Issue 2/2012 (October-December), ISSN: 2082-6710.

You can read the interview here and Tom Froese’s introduction here.

Several other interesting things in this issue. It can be downloaded as a whole.

Nonlinear Decision-Making and the Somatic Markers Hypothesis

Posted in General, Resources by Ezequiel on October 11, 2012

New publication potentially interesting to lifeandminders:

Bedia M. G. and Di Paolo E. A. (2012) Unreliable gut feelings can lead to correct decisions: the somatic marker hypothesis in non-linear decision chains. Front. Psychology 3:384. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00384
And a post explaining the main results of the mathematical model.





Branches of the social enactivism tree

Posted in General, Resources by Ezequiel on August 12, 2012

Some exciting recent work making use of enactive ideas such as participatory sense-making. Not written by the usual suspects.

Applications, extensions, criticisms…

Gestural sense-making: hand gestures as intersubjective linguistic enactments
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2011, DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9244-9
Elena Cuffari

The ubiquitous human practice of spontaneously gesturing while speaking demonstrates the embodiment, embeddedness, and sociality of cognition. The present essay takes gestural practice to be a paradigmatic example of a more general claim: human cognition is social insofar as our embedded, intelligent, and interacting bodies select and construct meaning in a way that is intersubjectively constrained and defeasible. Spontaneous co-speech gesture is markedly interesting because it at once confirms embodied aspects of linguistic meaning-making that formalist and linguistic turn-type philosophical approaches fail to appreciate, and it also forefronts intersubjectivity as an inherent and inherently normative dimension of communicative action. Co-speech hand gestures, as linguistically meaningful speech acts, demonstrate both sedimentation and spontaneity (in the sense of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic of linguistic expression (2002)), or features of convention and nonconvention in a Gricean sense (1989). Yet neither pragmatic nor classic phenomenological approaches to communication can accommodate the practice of co-speech hand gesturing without some rehabilitation and reorientation. Pragmatic criteria of intersubjectivity, normativity, and rationality need to confront the non-propositional and nonverbal meaning-making of embodied encounters. Phenomenological treatments of expression and intersubjectivity must consider the normative nature of high-order social practices like language use. Reciprocally critical exchanges between these traditions and gesture studies yield an improved philosophy that treats language as a multi-modal medium for collaborative meaning achievement. The proper paradigm for these discussions is found in enactive approaches to social cognition. Co-speech hand gestures are first and foremost emergent elements of social interaction, not the external whirring of an isolated internal consciousness. In contrast to current literature that frequently presents gestures as uncontrollable bodily upsurge or infallible imagistic phenomenon that drives and dances with verbal or “linguistic” convention (McNeill 1992, 2005), I suggest that we study gestures as dynamic, embodied, and shared tools for collaborative sense-making.

Keywords  Gesture – Language – Intersubjectivity – Normativity – Convention – Enaction

Narrative, meaning, interpretation: an enactivist approach

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume 11, Number 3 (2012), 367-384, DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9216-0

Marco Caracciolo

After establishing its roots in basic forms of sensorimotor coupling between an organism and its environment, the new wave in cognitive science known as “enactivism” has turned to higher-level cognition, in an attempt to prove that even socioculturally mediated meaning-making processes can be accounted for in enactivist terms. My article tries to bolster this case by focusing on how the production and interpretation of stories can shape the value landscape of those who engage with them. First, it builds on the idea that narrative plays a key role in expressing the values held by a society, in order to argue that the interpretation of stories cannot be understood in abstraction from the background of storytelling in which we are always already involved. Second, it presents interpretation as an example of what Di Paolo et al. (2010) have called in their recent enactivist manifesto a “joint process of sensemaking”: just like in face-to-face interaction, the recipient of the story collaborates with the authorial point of view, generating meaning. Third, it traces the meaning brought into the world by interpretation to the activation and, potentially, the restructuring of the background of the recipients of the story.

Keywords  Narrative – Sensemaking – Interpretation – Enaction

On the role of social interaction in social cognition: a mechanistic alternative to enactivism

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2011, DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9209-z

Mitchell Herschbach


Researchers in the enactivist tradition have recently argued that social interaction can constitute social cognition, rather than simply serve as the context for social cognition. They contend that a focus on social interaction corrects the overemphasis on mechanisms inside the individual in the explanation of social cognition. I critically assess enactivism’s claims about the explanatory role of social interaction in social cognition. After sketching the enactivist approach to cognition in general and social cognition in particular, I identify problems with an enactivist taxonomy of roles for social interaction in the explanation of social cognition (contextual, enabling, and constitutive). In particular, I show that this enactivist taxonomy does not clearly distinguish between enabling conditions and constitutive elements, which would make them in danger of committing the coupling-constitution fallacy found in some attempts to extend cognition. I explore resources enactivism has to more clearly demarcate constitutive parts of a cognitive system, but identify problems in applying them to some of the main cases of social cognition enactivists characterize as being constituted by social interaction. I offer the mechanistic approach to explanation as an alternative that captures much of what enactivists want to say about the relations between social and individual levels, but views social interactions from the perspective of embedded cognition rather than as being constitutive of social cognition.

Keywords  Social cognition – Social interaction – Enactivism – Mechanism – Explanation – Constitution – Extended cognition – Embedded cognition

Vulnerability to psychosis, I-thou intersubjectivity and the praecox-feeling

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2010, DOI: 10.1007/s11097-010-9173-z

Somogy Varga

Psychotic and prodromal states are characterized by distortions of intersubjectivity, and a number of psychopathologists see in the concrete I-You frame of the clinical encounter the manifestation of such impairment. Rümke has coined the term of ‘praecox-feeling’, designated to describe a feeling of unease emanating in the interviewer that reflects the detachment of the patient and the failure of an ‘affective exchange.’ While the reliability of the praecox-feeling as a diagnostic tool has since been established, the explanation and theoretical framing of the phenomena is still lacking. By drawing on enactivist approaches to social cognition, the paper will attempt to provide such an explanation. This is relevant, since such an explanation could contribute to a more precise understanding of the phenomena in question and possibly add to our knowledge regarding the link between experiential vulnerability to psychosis and disturbed I-Thou intersubjectivity.

Keywords  Psychosis – Praecox-feeling – Second-person – Intersubjectivity – Enactivism

Dynamic Embodied Cognition

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2011, DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9223-1

Leon C. de Bruin and Lena Kästner

In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes in explaining some cases of social interaction—not yet up to the task. This is because they (1) do not pay sufficient attention to the role of offline processing or “decoupling”, and (2) obscure the cognitive gap by overemphasizing the role of phenomenology. We argue that the main challenge for the enactive view will be to acknowledge the importance of both coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes for basic and advanced forms of (social) cognition. To meet this challenge, we articulate a dynamic embodied view of cognition. We illustrate the fruitfulness of this approach by recourse to recent findings on false belief understanding.

Keywords  Social cognition – Enactivism – Embodied cognition – Cognitive gap – False belief understanding

Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2011, DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9218-y

Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki

I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional stance is not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS—understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices—and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology.

Keywords  Embodied social cognition – Metapsychology – The intentional stance – Dennett – Gallagher – Hutto – Quotidian interpretation

Comment: Empathy and Participation—A Response to Fritz Breithaupt’s Three-Person Model of Empathy

Emotion Review 2012 vol. 4 no. 1 94-95, doi: 10.1177/1754073911421391

Jan Georg Söffner
Fritz Breithaupt’s “Three-Person Model of Empathy” (2012) offers a brilliant approach to relate empathy to side-taking. By thereby grounding empathy in subjective observation though, it becomes difficult to focus on how empathy interferes with phenomena of shared and embedded activity. This comment therefore raises the question of how Breithaupt’s theory of empathy can be related to phenomena of participatory sense-making and second-person interaction.

Keywords:   empathy, participatory sense-making, second-person interaction, sympathy

“Radical post-cognitivism: new approaches to intelligence and the mind” the inaugural lecture of Professor Mark Bishop

Posted in General by Andrew Martin on June 26, 2012

What follows is the review I wrote for the AISBQ of Mark Bishop’s inaugural lecture, which addressed the past, present and future of Cognitive Science, Enaction and Cognitive Computing.  The article was written for a slightly more general audience than I imagine necessary for this blog, so I’d be very happy to go into further detail or discussion in the comments of this page. – Andrew

On the 13th March, Professor Mark Bishop gave his inaugural lecture to a full lecture theatre at Goldsmiths, University of London. Entitled “Radical post-cognitivism: new approaches to intelligence and the mind”; described as the “integration of a lifetime’s work”, the theme was how the underlying assumptions of Cognitive Science have changed during Bishop’s career, and how he sees it developing in the future. The core argument was that much contemporary Cognitive Science research tacitly assumes intelligence is the result of computations upon conceptual representations; a philosophical stance that is at least questionable given many longstanding critiques [2].

Bishop identified three avenues by which Computationalism came to pervade Cognitive Science: (i) explicitly, that cognition was taken to be defined as computation upon representations;(ii) implicitly, that cognition could be defined as computation upon vectors of real numbers and(iii) descriptively, through confusion of accurate computational models of neurons with “an ontological claim about the reality of what neurons do”. “We can describe the operation of brain neurons mathematically, computationally, but that’s no reason to believe that brain neurons really do compute.”

The current state of the art of AI was addressed with a video of IBM’s Watson and a live demonstration of Apple’s Siri, which both seamlessly integrate natural language processing, voice recognition and information retrieval to a degree that many would have considered unfeasible only a few years ago, especially without extensive user calibration. Bishop noted that these undeniable successes utilised an approach that was not inspired by, or attempting to recreate, human intelligence. As such, contemporary artificial intelligence was shown to have successful applications, but was limited in its explanatory power.

Bishop continued by identifying weaknesses in a computational account of mind, firstly the human mind was suggested to be capable of insights unreachable through logical inference. This argument, citing John Lucas, Roger Penrose, and Kurt Gödel, showed there exists logical statements that a human can see to be true but a computational process could never prove to be true. Bishop subsequently questioned the very notion of computation, claiming that the criteria for assigning computational properties to a process are “observer relative”. This claim was fortified with reference to his earlier work on John Searle’s Chinese Room argument which criticises the notion that computation could ever lead to understanding and Bishop’s own “Dancing with Pixies” argument which aims to demonstrate that a strong computational theory of mind implies panpsychism  [5].

The other branch of computationalism, that mental processes manipulate representations, was considered next. An entertaining demonstration of inattentional blindness (including a few extra surprises for anyone who had previously “seen the gorilla”) the success of which questions whether the human mind actually processes a camera-like representation of the visual scene. Subsequently, the homuncular argument which claims that explaining vision with representations begs the question as the representations themselves require a observer. Bishop cited Dennett’s “content/vehicle distinction” clarifying he was not denying the existence of patterns of neural activity that appeared to represent the outside world, but that their existence was not sufficient evidence that they were being exploited as such by the mind.

As an introduction to an alternative to computationalism, Bishop described the operation of a centrifugal (or “Watt”) Governor, as an example of adaptive real-time behaviour, without objective representations. This led to a discussion of swarm intelligence, where intelligent behaviour can appear to emerge without the existence of a central executive controller or any encoding of a global goal. The application of this approach was further demonstrated with a discussion of the success of Bishop’s implementations of Stochastic Diffusion Search [1].

This led to Bishop’s concluding claim, that artificial intelligence and cognitive science are finally parting ways, artificial intelligence applying computational techniques on “big data” to real problem solving, but at the expense of providing insights on big questions about mind. Cognitive science can continue to address these questions, but to do so requires a change of tack to align itself more with philosophers such as the phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela who emphasise the role of the body, environment and action. Bishop encapsulated this emphasis in the phrase “My brain, in my body, in our world.”

On these grounds Bishop identified the “four E’s” defining characteristics for a new era of cognitive science, that research should recognise the extent to which they are: Ecological, accounting for the environment; Embodied, concerning the physical presence of a system; Embedded, concerning the system’s relation to the environment; Enactive, concerning the role of action.


[1] M. Bishop. Stochastic Searching Networks. In First IEE Conference on Artifical Neural Networks, pages 329–331, 1989.

[2] M. Bishop. A cognitive computation fallacy? cognition, computations and panpsychism. Cognitive Computation, 1(3):221–233,  2009.

[3] M. Bishop. Radical post-cognitivism: new approaches to intelligence and the mind. March 2012. Inaugural lecture given at Goldsmiths, University of London.

[4] S.J. Nasuto, M. Bishop, and K. De Meyer. Communicating neurons: A connectionist spiking neuron implementation of stochastic diffusion search. Neurocomputing, 72(4-6):704–712, 2009.
[5] J.Preston and M.Bishop. Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Clarendon Press, 2002.

The Interactive Brain Hypothesis

Posted in General, Resources by Ezequiel on June 7, 2012

A new paper is now available exploring the implications of participatory sense-making for social neuroscience.

The Interactive Brain Hypothesis

Ezequiel Di Paolo & Hanne De Jaegher

Abstract. Enactive approaches foreground the role of interpersonal interaction in explanations of social understanding. This motivates, in combination with a recent interest in neuroscientific studies involving actual interactions, the question of how interactive processes relate to neural mechanisms involved in social understanding. We introduce the Interactive Brain Hypothesis (IBH) in order to help map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neural processes. The hypothesis states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in both the development and current function of social brain mechanisms, even in cases where social understanding happens in the absence of immediate interaction. We examine the plausibility of this hypothesis against developmental and neurobiological evidence and contrast it with the widespread assumption that mindreading is crucial to all social cognition. We describe the elements of social interaction that bear most directly on this hypothesis and discuss the empirical possibilities open to social neuroscience. We propose that the link between coordination dynamics and social understanding can be best grasped by studying transitions between states of coordination. These transitions form part of the self-organization of interaction processes that characterize the dynamics of social engagement. The patterns and synergies of this self-organization help explain how individuals understand each other. Various possibilities for role-taking emerge during interaction, determining a spectrum of participation. This view contrasts sharply with the observational stance that has guided research in social neuroscience until recently. We also introduce the concept of readiness to interact to describe the practices and dispositions that are summoned in situations of social significance (even if not interactive). This latter idea links interactive factors to more classical observational scenarios.

Download your free PDF here:


Di Paolo E and De Jaegher H (2012) The interactive brain hypothesis. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:163. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00163