Seminar: A model of conscious presence based on interoceptive predictive coding

The next Life and Mind seminar in Tokyo will take place at 5:30pm this Friday. We are happy to have Keisuke Suzuki return to the Ikegami Lab to talk to us about his recent work.

A model of conscious presence based on interoceptive predictive coding

Keisuke Suzuki
Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science

Feeling of presence is refereed to the subjective sense of reality of the world, and of the self within the world. Evidences of virtual reality and of psychiatric disorder of presence called depersonalization disorder (DPD) indicate that presence is a characteristic of conscious experience itself, and not an instance of conscious experience. Despite the importance of presence in consciousness study, theoretical models of the neural mechanisms for presence are still absent. In this talk, I will describe a theoretical model of the conscious presence based on predictive coding to interoceptive states, that is, physiological conditions of the body. The model proposes that presence is the result of successful suppression by topdown predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked (directly) by autonomic control signals and (indirectly) by bodily responses to afferent sensory signals. The model is motivated from i) role of insular cortex in DPD patients, ii) the importance of insular cortex in controlling interoceptive signals, and in generating subjective feeling state, iii) the subjective sense of ‘agency’ is modeled in terms of predicting the sensory consequences of own actions. The model can offer a new perspective for a mechanical account of a phenomenological property of consciousness. Finally, I will discuss possible experiments to verify the proposed model.

All welcome!

Conference: Foundations of Enactive Cognitive Science

Dear colleagues,

We are excited to announce the organisation of the conference “Foundations of Enactive Cognitive Science”, held February 27-28th, 2012. The conference is sponsored by the Centre for Integrative Neuroscience and Neurodynamics, with the support of the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. If you intend to participate (even if you do not plan to submit a poster or a talk), we kindly ask that you send us an email, as we need to make some arrangements with the venue.

More information at: http://reading.ac.uk/cinn/enactivism

Dr. Etienne Roesch (Goldsmiths Univ. London; Univ. of Reading)
Dr. Slawomir Nasuto (Univ. of Reading)
Prof. John Mark Bishop (Goldsmiths Univ. London)

Video of Victor Loughlin’s seminar on ‘The Extended Mind and Consciousness’

Title: The Extended Mind and Consciousness
Speaker: Victor Loughlin

Abstract: Where does my mind stop and the rest of the world begin? Can my conscious experience involve the environment around me? Exponents of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) argue that the mind can extend outside the body. One such exponent of EMT is Andy Clark. Clark argues that the machinery responsible for cognition can include objects in the environment but the machinery responsible for consciousness must, as a matter of empirical fact, remain brain bound. I will argue that Clark is correct to think that cognition can extend but wrong to deny extension for consciousness. By looking at two examples of EMT, I intend to show that one of these examples supports claims for consciousness extension. I will then examine some of Clark’s objections to consciousness extension and argue that these objections are not persuasive. I conclude that, in the example outlined, the machinery responsible for cognition and for conscious experience can extend outside the body.

To discuss or comment on this seminar, click here.

Seminar: Victor Loughlin: The Extended Mind and Consciousness

I am very much looking forward to the ALERGIC / Life and Mind talk next week (Wednesday, 7 December) by Victor Loughlin who will be discussing the relationship between the Extended Mind Thesis and consciousness.  I think this should be a very interesting talk, and I hope to see you there!  We are returning to the usual time and place next week.  Abstract and details are below..

Cheers,
Matthew

ALERGIC / Life and Mind Seminar: Victor Loughlin
Wednesday 7 Dec.
4.30pm
ARUN-401
University of Sussex

Title: The Extended Mind and Consciousness
Speaker: Victor Loughlin

Abstract: Where does my mind stop and the rest of the world begin? Can my conscious experience involve the environment around me? Exponents of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) argue that the mind can extend outside the body. One such exponent of EMT is Andy Clark. Clark argues that the machinery responsible for cognition can include objects in the environment but the machinery responsible for consciousness must, as a matter of empirical fact, remain brain bound. I will argue that Clark is correct to think that cognition can extend but wrong to deny extension for consciousness. By looking at two examples of EMT, I intend to show that one of these examples supports claims for consciousness extension. I will then examine some of Clark’s objections to consciousness extension and argue that these objections are not persuasive. I conclude that, in the example outlined, the machinery responsible for cognition and for conscious experience can extend outside the body.

Seminar: Understanding Minds through Synthesis: A Neuro-Robotics Study

The next L&M seminar in Japan will take place on Monday, Nov. 14, at 4pm, in Room 107, Building 16, at the Komaba campus of the University of Tokyo. We are pleased to have Jun Tani from Riken BSI in Tokyo.

Understanding Minds through Synthesis: A Neuro-Robotics Study

Jun Tani
Behavior and Dynamic Cognition Lab
Riken Brain Science Institute

The difficulty in understanding minds is that their problems are inherently multifaceted. We can delve into so many different aspects and issues of minds, including subjectivity and consciousness in phenomenology, behavioral correlates in psychology, computational metaphors in cognitive science, biological implementation in neuroscience, and pathology and mechanisms of mental disorders in psychiatry. A good model of minds should, therefore, account for all these different aspects and would be better than having a different model for each.