The Life & Mind Seminar Network

Review of Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content

Posted in Seminars by Tom Froese on April 21, 2014

Tom Froese:

Here is my review of Hutto and Myin’s radical enactivism…

Originally posted on Dr. Tom Froese:

I was invited to write a review of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content for The Journal of Mind and Behavior. You can read my largely positive verdict here:

Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2013, 206 pages, $35.00 hardcover

Tom Froese

Increasing numbers of philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists are jumping on the embodied cognition bandwagon. Accordingly, mind is no longer viewed as locked away in some Platonic realm of pure logic, as the computational theory of mind has traditionally proposed. Instead, mind has become identified with purposeful activity in the world, an activity that is realized by the body, extended by usage of tools, and scaffolded by a sociocultural environment.

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AISB50 symposium – The Future of Art and Computing: A Post-Turing Centennial Perspective

Posted in Seminars by Tom Froese on February 26, 2014

Tom Froese:

The AISB50 symposium will also feature some cybernetic art …

Originally posted on Luciana Haill:

I am pleased to announce my paper Image“Revelations by Flicker: Dream Machines and Electroencephalographic signals in art” has been accepted for the AISB-50 Symposium on “The Future of Art and Computing: A Post-Turing Centennial Perspective”, to be held this April. The Symposium will be on Thursday 3rd April, I am scheduled for 2pm, with AISB-50 running 1-4 April, 2014.

How did an ordinary tool in the Neurophysiology department became a means for spiritual enlightenment? This article follows the emergence of the EEG in artworks, internalised like its predecessor from research laboratories, Flicker. The crossover occurred between Dr Grey Walter’s neurological research with strobes and electroencephalographs, and the arts culture of ‘The Beats’ following his publication of “The Living Brain.” Cyberneticians, psychologists and artists were soon inspiring each other with pioneering chemistry, new artistic styles and new ways of seeing.

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Tom Froese video talk at AISB 2014 symposium on Re-conceptualizing Mental “Illness”

Posted in Seminars by jackoflantern on February 26, 2014


Just a thumbs up that Tom has agreed to do a recorded video presentation for this year’s AISB symposium on Re-Conceptualizing Mental “Illness”:  Enactive Philosophy and Cognitive Science, An Ongoing Dialogue, 3-4 April at Goldsmiths in London.  For the second year now, I’m organizing the symposium with Blay Whitby.  Tom’s provisional title is “An Enactive Critique of the Psychopathologies of Cognitive Science”.  I’ll be posting a link to the talk here after the AISB convention, as well as some thoughts on the discussions there!

Joel Parthemore

Symposium on Varieties of Enactivism

Posted in CFP by Tom Froese on February 24, 2014

Varieties of Enactivism: A Conceptual Geography

A one-day symposium at AISB-50, 1st to 4th April 2014, London, UK

The direct perception hypothesis in comparative psychology

Posted in Seminars by Tom Froese on February 24, 2014

Tom Froese:

Steps toward an enactive approach to primatology…

Originally posted on Dr. Tom Froese:

After 4 years of effort, my take on comparative psychology has finally been published. Many thanks to my colleague Dave for his expert guidance and endless patience.

The direct perception hypothesis: perceiving the intention of another’s action hinders its precise imitation

Tom Froese and David A. Leavens

We argue that imitation is a learning response to unintelligible actions, especially to social conventions. Various strands of evidence are converging on this conclusion, but further progress has been hampered by an outdated theory of perceptual experience. Comparative psychology continues to be premised on the doctrine that humans and non-human primates only perceive others’ physical “surface behavior,” while mental states are perceptually inaccessible. However, a growing consensus in social cognition research accepts the direct perception hypothesis: primarily we see what others aim to do; we do not infer it from their motions. Indeed, physical details are overlooked – unless the action is unintelligible…

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